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The innovative activity of companies is a driving force for economic growth. New devel-
opments beneﬁt consumers by oﬀering a greater choice of products and services. Although
large companies spend a high share of the total R&D expenditure of the private sector,
small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) are also important players in the innovation
process. In 2004, companies with less then 500 employees contributed to 12.5% to the R&D
expenditures of the German private sector.
In this paper we analyze whether the equity capital available to SMEs aﬀects their R&D
activity using a representative survey of German companies. Equity is important for the
R&D activity, since bank loans are diﬃcult to obtain for R&D projects. Banks prefer to lend
to safer projects that are easier to evaluate and provide more collateral. Young companies
have speciﬁc problems with bank loans due to their higher default risk and since they still
need to establish a relationship with the bank. We test the hypothesis that companies
with a higher equity ratio will engage more in R&D activities, measured alternatively as
the probability of pursuing R&D and as the R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditures to
sales). The hypothesis is tested separately for young and old companies.
Using banking competition at the district level as instrument to control for reverse causal-
ity, we ﬁnd that a higher equity ratio is conducive to more R&D for young but not for old
companies. Whereas old companies have had time to build up equity via retained proﬁts,
young companies have to rely on the original investment of the owners. In addition, should
extra ﬁnancing be required while the R&D project is executed, older companies can rely
more on bank loans whereas young companies need to provide a ﬁnancial cushion for bad
times themselves.
The positive inﬂuence of equity ﬁnancing is only found for R&D intensity but not for the
decision whether to perform R&D. This suggests that equity is only important for higher
levels of R&D intensity, for example for young high-tech ﬁrms. These companies therefore
depend on a functioning market for external equity, if the personal funds of the original
owners are not suﬃcient to cover the ﬁnancing needs. If R&D is only a minor part in the
overall activities, young companies do not have a special requirement in terms of equity to
ﬁnance their R&D. It can be that for these ﬁrms the level of overall risk is low enough for
banks to be more willing to extend loans.The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity -
Are There Diﬀerences Between Young and Old
Companies?
Elisabeth Mueller∗ and Volker Zimmermann∗∗
First version: February 3, 2006
This version: January 2008
- FORTHCOMING: SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS -
Abstract
This paper analyzes the importance of equity ﬁnance for the R&D activity of small
and medium-sized enterprises. We use information on almost 6000 German SMEs
from a company survey. Using the intensity of banking competition at the district
level as an instrument to control for endogeneity, we ﬁnd that a higher equity ratio
is conducive to a higher R&D intensity. Owners may only start R&D activities if
they have the ﬁnancial resources to sustain them until successful completion. We
ﬁnd a larger inﬂuence of the equity ratio for young companies. Equity may be more
important for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of
their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can rely less
on bank ﬁnancing.
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The innovative activity of companies is a driving force for economic growth. Consumers
beneﬁt from a greater choice of products and services, whereas companies beneﬁt from
the creation of additional markets and earning opportunities. At the macroeconomic level,
innovations speed up structural adjustment to engender new viable sectors and play a vital
part for the creation of new jobs (Peters (2004)). Although large companies spend a high
share of the total R&D expenditure of the private sector, small and medium-sized companies
(SMEs) are also important players in the innovation process. In 2004, companies with less
than 500 employees contributed 12.5% to the R&D expenditures of the German private sector
(Stifterverband (2005)). On the one hand, small companies face disadvantages because they
cannot exploit scale economies and are restricted in the types of ﬁnancing they can raise
for their R&D activities. On the other hand, some characteristics of SMEs even facilitate
the implementation of R&D projects (Acs and Audretsch (1990)). Managers may know
more about the technology, there may be an entrepreneurial spirit more favourable to risk
taking, and researchers may encounter fewer bureaucratic hurdles (Scherer (1991); Link and
Bozeman (1991)).
The literature on R&D activity has originally mainly concentrated on the inﬂuence of com-
pany size, technological opportunity and appropriability (Cohen and Levin (1989)). More
recently, the inﬂuence of the ﬁnancial structure of the company has also been of interest.
Whereas some authors considered the inﬂuence of cash-ﬂows (see, for example, Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994)), we focus on the inﬂuence of equity ﬁnancing.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of whether the equity capital available
to companies aﬀects their R&D activity using a representative survey of German companies
from KfW Bankengruppe (formerly Kreditanstalt f¨ ur Wiederaufbau). We test the hypothesis
that companies with a higher equity ratio will engage more in R&D activities, measured
alternatively as the probability of pursuing R&D and as the R&D intensity (ratio of R&D
expenditures to sales).
We focus on unlisted, small and medium-sized companies. In contrast to listed companies,
they depend for their equity ﬁnancing strongly on the personal funds of a limited number
of owners. Furthermore, we diﬀerentiate between young and old companies. The R&D
activity of young companies is more likely to be constrained by the availability of equity
1capital, since young companies have not yet had the opportunity to increase their equity
base by accumulated earnings. We look at R&D expenditures as proxy for innovation since
R&D activities have typically a higher risk than other innovative activities, such as spending
money for licenses or for machines needed for new products.
Our results show that a higher equity ratio is conducive to a higher R&D intensity.
Owners may only start R&D activities if they have the ﬁnancial resources to sustain them
until successful completion. We ﬁnd a larger eﬀect for young companies. Equity may be
more important for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of
their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can rely less on bank
ﬁnancing. We do not ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence of the equity ratio on the decision whether
to perform R&D. Equity is therefore less important for companies for which R&D is only a
small part of the overall activities.
We improve on the existing literature in several ways. First, most of the literature inves-
tigating how the ﬁnancial side of companies inﬂuences their R&D activity is concerned with
sensitivities of cash-ﬂow and R&D. However, cash-ﬂow varies from year to year whereas R&D
often has a continuous component since it exhibits high adjustment costs. Furthermore, a
higher sensitivity of R&D to cash-ﬂow may eﬀectively indicate that the company responds
faster to changes in demand conditions (Hall (2005)). In contrast, the equity ratio as a
stock variable is an indicator of the resources that the company has available. Especially for
SMEs, this more fundamental characteristic of the company may be more relevant for the
R&D decision. The cash-ﬂow measure is possibly problematic for young companies, which
are still in the process of building up a customer base.
Second, we take the direction of causality explicitly into consideration. On the one hand,
the availability of equity can inﬂuence the R&D activity, since owners will only start R&D
projects if their capital base is suﬃcient to sustain projects until returns materialize. R&D
projects often have no early cash ﬂow to secure interest payments on loans and owners may
be unwilling to engage in R&D if it endangers the survival of the company. On the other
hand, companies with R&D activity may ﬁnd debt ﬁnancing especially expensive or may
not have access to this type of ﬁnancing at all. In addition, if innovative companies beneﬁt
from successful R&D projects via higher proﬁts, they can increase their equity base through
retained earnings. In order to identify the ﬁrst direction of causality, we use two alternative
2instruments for the equity ratio. The ﬁrst instrument is competition in the banking sector
at the district level; the second is a rating of the ﬁnancial standing of the company, a part
of the company’s credit rating.
Finally, we provide evidence for a bank-based system. Prior research found less severe
ﬁnancial constraints for innovative SMEs in bank-based systems (Hall (2005)). Our data
set covers the whole spectrum of SMEs with respect to age, size and industry and covers
companies with as well as without R&D activity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical background to
ﬁnancing decisions and R&D activity. Section 3 summarizes the existing literature. Section 4
describes the data set. Section 5 covers descriptive statistics. Section 6 presents the empirical
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
R&D projects have special characteristics that make external ﬁnancing diﬃcult. First, re-
turns of R&D projects are highly uncertain. Often there is a high probability of failure
combined with the possibility of high returns if successful. Second, the quality of R&D
projects is diﬃcult to evaluate. Not only is technical knowledge necessary, but owners also
want to keep details of their R&D activity secret. This results in severe problems of asym-
metric information in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard, which can aﬀect the
willingness of investors to provide both equity and debt capital ((Hall (2005) and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981)). Because a high R&D intensity is often an indicator for complex or radi-
cal innovations which are largely untested in the market, both uncertainty and asymmetric
information increase with R&D intensity.
Young companies may face speciﬁc challenges when conducting R&D. Lucas (1993) and
Irwin and Klenow (1994) point out that learning by doing leads to cost advantages for ﬁrms
with more market and R&D experience. Conducting R&D may therefore be more expensive
for younger ﬁrms than for older ones. Furthermore, R&D projects are often indivisible
(Cohen and Klepper (1996)) and young companies may have a lower amount of output over
which to spread the costs.
Companies can choose between three broad types of ﬁnancing: internal ﬁnancing (equity
from existing owners and retained earnings), external debt and external equity. Evidence
3from diﬀerent countries shows that SMEs rely mostly on internal ﬁnancing (Giudici and
Paleari (2000) and Manigart and Struyf (1997)). If SMEs seek outside ﬁnancing, then bank
loans are the preferred type (Hughes (1997)). In contrast, accessing external equity is a rare
event. Ou and Haynes (2006) ﬁnd for SMEs in the US that less than 1% of the surveyed
companies used this ﬁnancing type.
The speciﬁc characteristics of R&D projects described above make debt ﬁnancing in par-
ticular diﬃcult (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)). Due to ﬁxed interest payments banks
do not participate in the high returns of successful outcomes. They are therefore more con-
cerned with the probability of failure when calculating the price for the loan, which can lead
to high interest rates or to the decision not to lend at all (Stiglitz (1985)). Furthermore,
R&D projects often do not involve assets that can be used as collateral. Wages of scien-
tists and engineers account for a high share of R&D expenditures and if tangible assets are
bought, they have often a low resale value because they are company speciﬁc. R&D activity
therefore provides little inside collateral that could be oﬀered to banks to make lending less
risky. As shown by Bester (1985), collateral is also important because it can be used as a
screening device to avoid rationing in credit markets.1
Empirical evidence shows that innovators have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of being
successful with long-term loan applications (Freel (1999)). The probability of being successful
with loan applications decreases as the R&D intensity of the companies increases (Freel
(2007)). However, the author ﬁnds tentative evidence that a limited degree of innovative
activity may be better than a lack thereof, since it may signal a higher viability of the
company. Sch¨ afer et al. (2004) investigate the choice between debt and equity for young
innovative SMEs in Germany. They ﬁnd that banks limit their risk by concentrating on
ﬁrms with a high equity ratio, high price-cost-margin and a smaller deal size.
Young companies have age-speciﬁc problems with access to bank loans. Banks use re-
lationship lending to alleviate problems of asymmetric information when lending to small
companies (see, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995)).
Banks collect information about the companies over time, which allows them to make well-
1Collateral is an important instrument used by banks. In their sample of bank loans extended by ﬁve
large German banks, Elsas and Krahnen (2002) ﬁnd that 71% of the loans are collateralized and 31.5% of
the total credit volume is covered by collateral. Lehmann et al. (2004) report average collateral coverage of
61% for Western Germany and 53% for Eastern Germany.
4founded loan decisions. Since young companies start without such a track record, banks may
be reluctant to oﬀer them loans. Also, young companies generally have less collateral avail-
able to pledge to banks (Berger and Udell (1998)). This can be an especially severe problem
for technology-based start ups with high R&D intensity and large ﬁnancing requirements.
The higher default risk of young companies is a further age speciﬁc impediment for bank
loans. Fritsch et al. (2006) document the probabilities for going out of business for German
companies, ﬁnding a decrease in the probability of exit with ﬁrm age. After ten years only
46 percent of the start-ups in manufacturing are still in business and about 37 percent of the
start-ups in services. There are several possible reasons for the higher exit rates of young
companies, among them inexperienced management, problems developing a customer base
and problems establishing the product in the market.
Because of the above-mentioned problems of bank loans, external equity is considered as
an important source of ﬁnance for innovative ﬁrms. Venture capital (VC) as “smart capital” –
with the expertise in selecting the projects, qualiﬁed consultations and assistance – increases
the prospects of success and consequently the expected project value. This characteristic
combined with participation in the upside potential of projects makes VC more suitable for
the ﬁnancing of R&D than bank loans. However, the share of VC ﬁnancing that is available
for the seed phase is very limited. Venture capitalists are reluctant to ﬁnance technology
based companies at a very early stage (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002)). Murray and Lott (1995)
ﬁnd that UK venture capitalists set more rigorous criteria for technology projects than for
non-technology projects. In addition, evidence from Scott (2000a) shows that owners are
averse to losing control to venture capitalists. Even in countries with a well developed VC
market, some owners will ﬁnd the cost of using this ﬁnancing type too high. External equity
can also be raised by admitting additional owners to the company. Yet, this route of ﬁnancing
also means that existing owners will lose part of their control, which may deter owners from
using this possibility (Cressy and Olofsson (1997) and M¨ uller (forthcoming)).
How well is the German ﬁnancial system adapted to the ﬁnancing of young, high-technology
companies? Throughout post-war history and, to a more limited extent, also up to now,
the German ﬁnancial system has been characterized by its strong focus on debt ﬁnancing
and bank intermediation. Audretsch and Eston (1997) ﬁnd that the system is well suited
to ﬁnance large and small companies in traditional sectors. However, it is less well suited
5to ﬁnance startups in newly emerging high-technology industries. In addition, the VC mar-
ket in Germany is not well developed (Zimmermann and Karle (2005)). In the year 2005
only 1029 companies received venture capital ﬁnancing (BVK (2006)), although there are ap-
proximately 36,000 SMEs performing continuous R&D in Germany (Rammer et al. (2006)).2
Furthermore the early stage segment in the German VC market has been declining since the
boom period at the end of the nineties. The share of the early stage segment in total fundrais-
ing decreased from 35 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2005 (BVK (2006)). This shows that
even investors in the VC market hesitate to take the high risks of young innovative ﬁrms.
Because funds have increasingly been pulled out of the early stage in Germany since 2001
and have been invested in the later stage, investments in the early stage segment in recent
years were lower than at the end of the 1990s. So it is not surprising that VC investments
in German high-tech startups are still scarce: Only 5.5% of all high-tech startups founded
between 1996 and 2005 received venture capital (Niefert et al. (2006, p. 29)). In contrast
to Germany, the US has a stock-market based ﬁnancial system with a much more developed
VC industry. Black and Gilson (1998) point to the importance of stock markets as exit
opportunity for venture capitalists. The volume of VC investments as percentage of GDP is
three times higher in the US than in Germany (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002)).
From the above discussion of potential problems with external ﬁnancing and of the char-
acteristics of the German ﬁnancial system it can be concluded that internal ﬁnancing will
play an important role in the ﬁnancing of R&D activities of German companies. In fact,
internal ﬁnancing may be a restricting factor. This may be especially the case for young
companies, since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings. Accordingly, the empiri-
cal analysis in this paper investigates whether ﬁrms with a high equity ratio carry out more
R&D and whether the importance of the equity ratio is higher for younger ﬁrms.
2 The number of R&D performing SMEs in Rammer et al. (2006) includes only companies with at least
ﬁve employees and excludes the retail sector. The statistics of the German Private Equity and Venture
Capital Association (BVK) are the most comprehensive information available. According to the BVK they
cover 90% of the volume of the German VC market (Krahnen and Schmidt (2004)).
63 Related Literature
The analysis in this paper focuses on the inﬂuence of the ﬁnancial structure on the R&D
activity of companies. This direction of causality has so far found limited attention in the
literature. Baldwin et al. (2002) use data for Canadian SMEs to investigate the relationship
of R&D intensity and leverage in a system of equations but do not discuss identifying re-
strictions. For listed companies in the US, Singh and Faircloth (2005) document a negative
inﬂuence of leverage on R&D intensity. The authors restrict their sample to companies with
minimum positive R&D expenditure and do not use instruments to establish the direction of
causality. Since the sample excludes companies without R&D and without continuous R&D
activity, the analysis can not cover the decision to undertake R&D. For large German com-
panies, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) identify a negative relationship between leverage and
innovation output measured by patents. Bhagat and Welch (1995) compare the inﬂuence of
leverage on R&D intensity across countries for listed companies using a VAR approach. For
the US they ﬁnd a positive eﬀect, whereas it is negative for Japan. The authors conclude
that US lenders may be less willing to ﬁnance R&D projects. Also using a VAR approach,
Chiao (2002) ﬁnds a negative inﬂuence of debt on R&D intensity for listed US companies in
science-based industries and a positive inﬂuence for companies in nonscience-based indus-
tries.
So far, the literature has mainly been concerned with the direction of causality from
R&D activity to the capital structure. For a sample of SMEs from the UK, Jordan et al.
(1998) ﬁnd that companies with an innovation strategy have lower leverage and companies
with a higher capital intensity have higher leverage. Both eﬀects can be explained with the
availability of collateral. Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) study the determinants of leverage
for small, unlisted Finnish companies. The authors document especially low leverage for
companies in the ICT sector with high R&D intensity. In contrast, Mac An Bhaird and
Lucey (2006) ﬁnd no relationship between R&D intensity and short- and long-term leverage
for Irish SMEs. Some authors restrict their analysis to the inﬂuence of the asset structure.
Chittenden et al. (1996) ﬁnd a positive relationship between the share of ﬁxed assets and
leverage for unlisted UK companies. For Australian companies in the start-up phase, Cassar
(2004) ﬁnds that the share of ﬁxed assets has a positive relationship with long-term leverage
and bank ﬁnancing but a negative relationship with total leverage and outside ﬁnancing.
7The way R&D activity inﬂuences leverage has also been studied for large companies. Bah
and Dumontier (2001) ﬁnd lower leverage for R&D intensive companies in the USA, UK,
Japan and countries in continental Europe. Aghion et al. (2004) ﬁnd higher leverage for
listed UK companies with R&D activity and that leverage decreases with increasing R&D
intensity.
Our analysis is also related to the literature studying the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial constraints
on the investment behaviour of companies. Companies are said to be ﬁnancially constrained
if they face higher costs of external as compared to internal ﬁnance. The approach of
investigating cash-ﬂow investment sensitivities was developed by Fazzari et al. (1988) and
applied to German companies by, for example, Harhoﬀ (1998), Audretsch and Weigand
(2005) and Audretsch and Eston (2002). Later this approach was also applied to R&D
expenditures. For the US, a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between R&D expenditures
and cash-ﬂow is found (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Hall (1992)). Bond et al.
(2007) ﬁnd no inﬂuence of cash ﬂow on R&D expenditures of German companies, whereas
cash ﬂow inﬂuences whether UK companies perform R&D. There are therefore diﬀerences
between companies in bank-based and market-based systems.
A less closely related strand of the literature uses direct evidence on ﬁnancing constraints
from company surveys. Egeln et al. (1997) ﬁnd an inverse U-shaped relationship between
company age and whether ﬁnancial restrictions are important obstacles to innovation ac-
tivities of German companies. The restrictions are most important for companies at the
age of 5-10 years. Also for Germany, Winker (1999) ﬁnds a negative inﬂuence of ﬁnancing
constraints on investment and innovation expenditures. There is evidence from Italy that
high-tech ﬁrms have a higher probability of being credit constrained than low-tech ﬁrms
(Guiso (1998)). In a similar fashion, among high-technology ﬁrms in the UK the most tech-
nologically sophisticated are most likely confronted with ﬁnancial constraints (Westhead and
Storey (1997)). Hartarska and Gonzalez-Vega (2006) ﬁnd for Russian companies that the
availability of internal funds is of higher importance for the investment decision of younger
than of older companies.
84 Data
The analysis is based on a panel survey of German small and medium-sized companies
conducted by KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt/Main, Germany (KfW-Mittelstandspanel). In
addition to basic company characteristics, this data set includes information on the innova-
tive activities of companies and their ﬁnancial structure. Small and medium-sized companies
are deﬁned as companies with less than Euro 500 million turnover. There is no minimum
number of employees required for the inclusion into the panel. This is a big advantage
compared to other data sets, since many surveys impose a size requirement of at least ﬁve
employees. We ﬁnd that even the smallest companies report substantive innovative activity;
for example, 10% of companies without employees have positive R&D expenditures. It can
also be expected that very small companies have more severe ﬁnancing problems. In order to
better understand the relationship between ﬁnancial structure and R&D activity for SMEs,
it is important to observe the very small companies in the data. The survey covers both the
manufacturing and the service sector. Companies in the banking and insurance industry are
excluded from our analysis.3
The sample of the survey was determined with a stratiﬁed random sample procedure.
The stratiﬁcation was done according to six size groups (up to 4 employees, 5-9, 10-19, 20-
49, 50-99 and 100 or more employees), ﬁve industries (manufacturing, construction, retail,
wholesale and services), region (Western versus Eastern Germany) and participation in a
government support programme for SMEs conducted by KfW Bankengruppe.
Information on 5,795 companies from the ﬁrst wave collected in 2003 is used for the
analysis. The survey achieved a response rate of 17.5%, which is in the typical range for
company surveys. A non-response analysis was conducted for the second wave with respect
to investment behaviour.4 The analysis found no relationship between participation in the
survey and positive versus zero real investment volume in a given year. We expect that
3The R&D ﬁgures of very small companies may be less precise than the ﬁgures of large companies, since
small companies often do not track R&D expenditures explicitly in their accounting system. However, this
should not inﬂuence our analysis, since a systematic relationship of the imprecision with the the equity ratio
is unlikely. There is no indication that small companies would inﬂate R&D expenditures to hide proﬁts or
would deﬂate sales revenue to appear smaller. Speciﬁcally, there is no R&D tax credit in Germany. All
regressions contain controls for size.
4The second wave can not be included for this analysis, since it contains no information about R&D.
9the relationship between the equity ratio and the R&D activity of the companies – which
is the main focus of this paper – will also not be aﬀected by the participation decision
of the companies. We do not have access to the master data set with information about
the companies that did not respond to the survey. We are therefore not able to explicitly
control for selection of respondents with a two-step Heckman or similar approach. For
the empirical analysis we choose unweighted regression procedures with controls for the
stratiﬁcation variables. There are no weights available that would take the probability of
inclusion in our subsamples into account.
5 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Table 1. The average number of
employees measured in full-time equivalents is below 50, since only small and medium-sized
companies are covered. The age of the companies has a wide dispersion with an average of
32 years. The equity ratio, deﬁned as book value of equity capital divided by total assets,
has an average value of 21%.5 The R&D intensity, deﬁned as R&D expenditures divided by
sales, has a mean of 2.0% and 26% of the companies report R&D activity, i.e. positive R&D
expenditures. 31% of the companies are in the manufacturing sector, 18% in construction,
28% in retail/wholesale and 23% in services.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Number of employees 47.7 18.5 82.0 0 948
Company age (in years) 31.7 13 37.5 1 410
Equity ratio (in %) 20.9 15.0 21.1 0 100
R&D intensity (in %) 1.96 0 5.58 0 70
Dummy for R&D activity 0.26 0 0.44 0 1
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, wave of 2003. All values refer to the year 2002.
5A small number of companies with negative equity were excluded from the sample. Liabilities can exceed
the assets of a company, if repeated losses eat up the equity capital. The company is not closed, if creditors
believe that loans can be repaid with future proﬁts. Companies with zero equity were retained.
10Table 2: Company Characteristics According to R&D Activity
Mean Median
Sig. lev.
Variable R&D no R&D diﬀerence R&D no R&D
Number of employees 71.0 39.7 < 1% *** 35.5 15
Total assets (in ’000 EUR) 8,045 5,985 < 1% *** 3,100 1,450
Total equity (in ’000 EUR) 2,085 1,221 < 1% *** 423 168
Company age (in years) 32.2 31.5 73% 13 13
Equity ratio (in %) 22.8 20.3 < 1% *** 18.0 13.0
Equity per owner (in ’000 EUR) 1,026 536 < 1% *** 235 100
Number of owners 1.96 1.69 < 1% *** 2 1
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, wave of 2003. All values refer to the year 2002.
In order to get a better understanding of the ﬁnancing conditions of small and medium-
sized companies, we investigate whether there are structural diﬀerences between companies
with and without R&D activity. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both company types.
A striking diﬀerence is the signiﬁcantly larger size of R&D performing companies, which is
reﬂected in almost twice the number of employees. The larger size is also indicated by a
higher value of total assets and of total equity.6 There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences with
respect to company age – the diﬀerence in the mean is negligible.
The ﬁnancing choices of both company types vary markedly, illustrating a higher need
for equity capital for innovative companies. The equity ratio is 2.5 percentage points higher
for companies with positive R&D activity. A diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. In addition, owners of companies with R&D activity on average invest a
substantially higher amount. Equity per owner has a mean of Euro 1,026,000 for companies
with and of Euro 536,000 for companies without R&D activity. In order to raise enough
equity, companies can tap the personal funds of several owners. This possibility is reﬂected
in a higher number of owners in innovative companies. Both the diﬀerences in equity per
owner and in the number of owners are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6The size diﬀerence cannot be explained with companies being larger in industries that typically perform
more R&D as the diﬀerence still exists after controlling for industry eﬀects.
11The diﬀerences in the equity ratio between companies with and without R&D can also be
seen in Figure 1. The equity ratio of R&D performing ﬁrms is higher in all age groups than
the equity ratio of non R&D performing ﬁrms. The equity ratio increases continually up to
the age group containing companies with a maximum age of 50 years, because companies use
proﬁts to pay back bank loans and to increase the equity capital through retained earnings.
For R&D performing ﬁrms the data show a decrease for very old companies.
Finally, for R&D performing companies we investigate R&D intensities according to age
and size in Table 3. We ﬁnd that young and small companies have substantially higher
R&D intensities on average than old or large companies. Some of the young companies are
presumably still in the process of introducing their products in the market and therefore
have only limited sales. It is interesting to note that the median R&D intensity is identical
across subgroups. The diﬀerences between the subgroups therefore occur at the higher end
of the distribution.
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12Table 3: R&D Intensity of Subgroups
R&D Intensity
Subgroup Mean Median No. of obs.
Young companies (<= 10 years) 10.0 5.0 473
Old companies (> 10 years) 6.51 5.0 1016
Small companies (<= 20 employees) 10.3 5.0 548
Large companies (> 20 employees) 6.09 5.0 941
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, wave of 2003. All values refer to the year 2002. Only companies with
positive R&D expenditure are included.
6 The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity
6.1 Empirical Model
For the empirical analysis we ﬁrst employ a Tobit model with the R&D intensity as dependent
variable. It takes account of the fact that many companies report zero values of R&D
expenditure. In the Tobit model regressors have the same inﬂuence on the probability of
doing a positive amount of R&D as on the R&D intensity itself, a restriction that is lifted
in the second model. The hurdle model (see Cragg (1971)) consists of two parts: the ﬁrst
is a probit model showing inﬂuences on the probability of having positive amounts of R&D
expenditure; the second is a Tobit model restricted to companies with positive R&D. The
separation into two parts allows for more ﬂexibility. If there are diﬀerences either in the
size of the inﬂuence of explanatory variables or in their signiﬁcance, the hurdle model makes
them transparent.
6.2 Controlling for Reverse Causality
Our estimates can be inﬂuenced by reverse causality. Not only can equity capital be a
prerequisite for R&D activity, it is also possible that companies with R&D activity select a
capital structure with a higher proportion of equity, since bank loans can be more expensive
for riskier companies. Also, companies with R&D activity can have diﬃculties with obtaining
a bank loan at all.
13In order to identify the eﬀect of the equity ratio on the R&D activity, we use instruments.
The ﬁrst instrument is the local banking competition. Theoretically, more intense competi-
tion in the banking sector can have two eﬀects. It can improve the availability of bank loans
if banks spend more resources to identify good companies in order to keep their market share.
It can also decrease the availability of loans, since companies can more easily switch from
one bank to the other. Banks therefore ﬁnd it harder to obtain rents from ongoing customer
relationships with good companies and may therefore be less willing to extend loans to new
companies.7 The availability of loans inﬂuences the equity ratio of the companies. If loans
are more easily available, companies will operate with a lower equity ratio.
We deﬁne banking competition at the district level as the number of banks active in a
district divided by the population of the district. Data on the number of banks and their
branches at the district level are obtained from the Bundesbank, the former German central
bank. Since districts are of varying size and more banks will be active in larger districts,
we use the population to normalize the variable.8 The number of banks active in a district
corresponds to the number of banks that have at least one branch in this district. For
example, Deutsche Bank is not only active in Frankfurt/Main, but in each district where it
operates a branch.
Whereas it is diﬃcult to imagine that banking competition should have a direct inﬂuence
on the R&D activity of companies, there are possibly indirect inﬂuences. Banking competi-
tion may be higher in districts with a higher income per capita, because the market is more
lucrative. A higher income can be an indicator for a well educated population, which can
be related to a higher average R&D intensity of the companies in the district, since R&D
intensive companies ﬁnd it more attractive to settle in districts where they can ﬁnd a well
educated work force. In the instrumental variable regressions we therefore control for the
income per capita at the district level and include dummies for a classiﬁcation of districts
into nine categories according to urban or rural type. It is also conceivable that the industrial
structure of a region inﬂuences both R&D intensity and banking competition. We control
7Petersen and Rajan (1995) develop this argument and provide empirical evidence for this eﬀect for US
banks. However, for the German capital market with a strong relationship between the company and a
single bank (“Hausbankprinzip”) it can be assumed that this argument is less relevant.
8Germany is divided into 439 districts (Kreis or kreisfreie Stadt). Berlin is the largest district with a
population of 3.4 million and Zweibr¨ ucken is the smallest district with a population of 36,000.
14for this possibility by including the share of employees working in the manufacturing sector
as regressor.9
We calculate a second set of estimates with the instrument ﬁnancial standing of the
companies to test the robustness of our results. The information is obtained from Germany’s
largest credit rating agency, Creditreform, and then merged to the KfW-Mittelstandspanel.
The ﬁnancial standing is an element of the overall credit rating. It is coded from one for
the best standing to six for the worst. Suppliers of trade credit can enquire at Creditreform
about the ﬁnancial standing of their customers to help them with their credit decision. Since
banks prefer to lend to good risks, the rating also gives an indication of how easy a company
will ﬁnd it to obtain bank loans. This instrument should therefore be correlated with the
endogenous variable equity ratio. On the other hand, Creditreform uses no information
about R&D activity to determine the ﬁnancial standing. The instrument should therefore
not be correlated with the error term of the second-stage regressions.
In the regressions we also control for whether companies participated in a government
support programme conducted by KfW Bankengruppe and whether companies have limited
liability. It can be argued that both variables are potentially endogenous. There is a large
literature on the selection of companies into programmes to support R&D (see, for example,
Busom (2000)). However, the programmes here are not related to R&D activities but support
the general investment activities of existing and newly founded companies. The programmes
are therefore not related to the main aspect of our analysis. The legal form of a company may
be chosen simultaneously with R&D activity. Since we do not have appropriate instruments
for legal form, we cannot control for the potential endogeneity of this variable.
The results of the ﬁrst-stage regressions are reported in Table 4. Column (1) reports
the results for the use of banking competition. A higher degree of competition leads to
a signiﬁcantly lower equity ratio, i.e. the supply of bank loans improves with competition.
Column (2) shows that companies with a better ﬁnancial standing have a higher equity ratio.
The instrument is signiﬁcant to the 1% level.10
9Income per capita, population ﬁgures and share of employees in the manufacturing sector are taken
from Statistik regional 2004, German National Statistical Oﬃces (Statistische ¨ Amter des Bundes und der
L¨ ander). The categorization of districts follows INKAR 2004, Federal Oﬃce for Construction and Regional
Planning (Bundesamt f¨ ur Bauwesen und Raumordnung).
10Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest the rule of thumb that instruments are weak, if the test of excluded
15Table 4: First Stage Regression Results
(1) (2)
Dep. variable Equity ratio
Local banking competition -1.421** (0.708)
Financial standing -0.267*** (0.053)
No of employees -0.003 (0.006) -0.007 (0.007)
Square no of employees 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Age 0.094*** (0.015) 0.096*** (0.019)
Square age -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
No of observations 5,795 4,288
R2 0.043 0.050
Partial R2 of excl. instruments 0.001 0.005
Test of excl. instruments 4.0** 25.8***
F(1, 5736) F(1, 4239)
Note: All regressions contain a dummy for whether the company participated in a government support
programme, a regional dummy and industry dummies comparable to the 3-digit SIC level. The regression in
column (1) also contains controls for income per capita at district level, for the share of employees working
in the manufacturing sector at district level and eight dummies for district type. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
6.3 Estimates without Instruments
In Table 5 column (1) we present the results of the Tobit model and in columns (2) to (3) the
results of the hurdle model. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between equity
ratio and R&D activity for the Tobit model and for the ﬁrst part of the hurdle model covering
the probability of R&D. For the R&D intensity restricted to R&D performing companies we
ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect. These results can be inﬂuenced by reverse causality
since the equity ratio is not instrumented. The equity ratio and the number of employees
are scaled diﬀerently in the statistical analysis than in Table 1: equity ratio is expressed as
a ratio and the number of employees is in ’000.11
instruments has an F smaller than 10. The instrument ﬁnancial standing passes this test, but the instrument
banking competition does not pass. However, using both instruments individually we obtain similar results.
11The marginal eﬀects in Tables 5 to 7 are calculated with the Stata procedure mfx (Stata (2007, p. 269)).


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Evaluated at the mean of the number of employees we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of size on R&D for the models of columns (1) and (2) and a negative and signiﬁcant
inﬂuence for column (3). Large companies therefore have a higher probability of pursuing
R&D but have lower R&D intensities. The age variable has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect at its mean in all three models. The control for limited liability shows a positive and
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the probability of R&D, but has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the R&D
intensity of R&D performing companies. We also control for participation in a government
support programme, a regional indicator and industry classiﬁcation, because these variables
were used to stratify the random sample.
Columns (4) to (6) contain the same econometric models with an interaction term allowing
for a diﬀerent inﬂuence of the equity ratio for young and old companies.12 A company is
deﬁned as young if it is ten years old or younger. The standard Tobit regression shows no
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity ratio for old companies. For young companies we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The sum of the coeﬃcients of the basis and interaction term of the equity
ratio is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly larger for young
than for old companies. There is now no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity ratio on the
probability of performing R&D for either young or old companies. It is possible that the
strength of the inﬂuence is not suﬃcient any more once the sample is split according to age.
For the Tobit speciﬁcation considering only companies that are active in R&D we again ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity ratio on the R&D intensity for young but not for old
companies. The inﬂuence of the equity ratio is signiﬁcantly higher for young than for old
companies. The analogous speciﬁcation without age interaction does not show a signiﬁcant
eﬀect, since the relationship for young companies is confounded by the lack of a relationship
for the old companies. Since we use no instruments here, it is not clear whether this result
should be interpreted as indicating equity as a necessary ﬁnancing type for R&D or as R&D
intensity inﬂuencing the ﬁnancial structure of the young companies.
6.4 Estimates with Instruments
In order to identify the direction of causality, we instrument the variable equity ratio. Table 6
presents results with local banking competition used as an instrument. The speciﬁcations in
12The sample contains 1,873 companies up to the age of 10 years (32% of the total).
18columns (1) to (3) without interaction terms now show no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity
ratio. The diﬀerence in the results can give an indication of the direction of causality. The
lack of signiﬁcance for the instrumented probit regression can mean that the availability of
equity ﬁnancing does not inﬂuence the decision whether to perform R&D, whereas companies
active in R&D do indeed choose a ﬁnancial structure with more equity. The insigniﬁcance
of the equity ratio could also mean that the instrument is too weak. In the instrumented
regressions some of the additional control variables lose their signiﬁcance, but the ones that
remain signiﬁcant always keep their sign.
Columns (4) to (6) present the results of the regressions with an interaction term. As in
the regressions without instruments, the Tobit model shows a signiﬁcantly larger inﬂuence
of the equity ratio for young companies, but the sum of the basis and interaction term is
not signiﬁcant any more. The hurdle model of columns (5) and (6) gives additional insights,
since it allows for separate inﬂuences on the probability of R&D activity and on the R&D
intensity. The ﬁrst part of the hurdle model shows no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity
ratio on the decision to undertake R&D. In the second part of the hurdle model, where
only companies with R&D activity are considered, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly larger inﬂuence
of the equity ratio for young companies. As in the Tobit model of column (4), the sum of
the basis and the interaction term is not signiﬁcant. This can be due to a weak correlation
of the instrument banking competition with the equity ratio. Future research may be able
to provide more precise estimates of this relationship. The inﬂuence of the equity ratio on
the R&D intensity is economically important. For old companies an increase in the equity
ratio of one standard deviation increases the R&D intensity by 4.5 percentage points. The
standard deviation, measured as a ratio, is equal to 0.21. The eﬀect for young companies is
about 20% larger. Here an increase in the equity ratio of one standard deviation leads to an
increase in the R&D intensity of 5.3 percentage points. This is a large eﬀect given that the
mean of the R&D intensity of R&D performing companies is 7.6%.
The results of the hurdle model suggest that managers only choose to start large R&D
projects if they have the necessary ﬁnancial resources to bring them to successful completion.
Equity ﬁnancing is especially important for companies with high R&D intensity, for example
for high-tech ﬁrms. If R&D is only a minor part in the overall activities of the company,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20The level of overall risk is possibly low enough in these ﬁrms for banks to be willing to extend
loans. Another explanation could be that these companies can pledge enough collateral from
other activities to satisfy the requirements of the bank for ﬁnancing their low intensity R&D
activities.
The inﬂuence of the equity ratio is somewhat larger for young than for old companies.
Whereas old companies have had time to build up equity via retained proﬁts, young com-
panies have to rely on the original investment made by the owners. In addition, older and
more diversiﬁed companies can ﬁnance part of their R&D activity with bank loans, since
they can provide collateral from other business activities. Evidence by Scott (2000b) for US
companies is consistent with this interpretation of our ﬁndings. It shows that younger com-
panies and companies with managers lacking business experience have a lower probability of
using outside equity ﬁnancing for R&D projects. The younger companies depend on their
own equity to ﬁnance their activities.
Table 7 shows results with the instrument ﬁnancial standing. For the ﬁrst part of the
hurdle model in column (5) we again ﬁnd no signﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity ratio on the
probability of pursuing R&D. For the second part of the hurdle model in column (6) the
size of the diﬀerence in the inﬂuence of the equity ratio between young and old companies is
very similar. However, the basis term of the equity ratio has a much smaller coeﬃcient when
estimated with the instrument ﬁnancial standing. Whereas companies in Eastern Germany
had a signiﬁcantly higher probability of pursuing R&D when using the instrument banking
competition, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between companies from Eastern and Western
Germany when the instrument ﬁnancial standing is used. Diﬀerences in the estimates can
be due to diﬀerences in how well the instruments are correlated with the equity ratio.
Unfortunately, our analysis does not provide direct evidence on whether companies are
restricted by the availability of equity capital. If the original owners cannot increase their
investment because of exhausted personal funds, it is, in principle, possible to admit addi-
tional owners to increase the equity capital available to the company. However, it is often
not easy to ﬁnd a person who is willing to invest his or her funds in a risky ﬁrm and who
ﬁts into the existing team of owners. The availability of seed or early-stage ﬁnancing from
venture capitalists is limited in Germany as well as in many other countries. In addition,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22they do not want to share control of the company. This last point is also an argument against
an investment by venture capitalists, since they demand inﬂuence as well. Hence, owners of
companies may be only willing to engage in substantial R&D activities if enough equity is
available or if the returns of the R&D project are high enough to make the acquisition of
additional equity feasible and worthwhile. Scott (2000a) ﬁnds evidence that supports the
direction of causality of our analysis from equity ﬁnance to R&D intensity. Owners of US
companies participating in the SBIR programme reported that they were looking for outside
ﬁnancing, needed it and were constrained in their R&D activities by its absence.
In some situations the required returns for obtaining new equity from additional owners
or venture capitalists may be too high. Companies may then refrain from undertaking R&D.
Since R&D projects have positive externalities (Arrow (1962)), there may be a reason for the
government to support the R&D activities of companies. For some companies the social rate
of return on projects may be higher than the opportunity costs of equity capital, whereas
the private rate of return may be lower. Governments could try to improve the access to
equity capital or could initiate support programmes that provide cheaper equity capital.
6.5 Robustness Checks
The results of our analysis are robust to a number of variations in the regression speciﬁcation.
We obtain identical results if we use alternative measures of local banking competition as an
instrument. We try the Herﬁndahl index and the sum of the three largest market shares, each
at the district level. The market share of a bank is measured as the number of subsidiaries
a bank has in a district divided by the total number of subsidiaries in the district.
We also experiment with diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points for the classiﬁcation of a young company.
There is a trade-oﬀ between including only very young companies and thereby reducing the
number of observations and extending the range to older companies and possibly blurring
the eﬀects of young age. We obtain identical results if we restrict the category of young
companies to a maximum age of eight years. We ﬁnd a change in the results, if we include
companies up to the age of 12. The diﬀerential eﬀect for young companies becomes much
smaller and is insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we exclude companies from the analysis that report an equity value of zero. The
results also remain identical with this change.
237 Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence on the relationship between the capital structure of SMEs
and their R&D activities. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the equity ratio on the prob-
ability of pursuing R&D. However, for R&D performing companies the equity ratio has a
positive inﬂuence on the R&D intensity. This inﬂuence is larger for young companies. In
order to control for reverse causality we alternatively use the variable local banking com-
petition and the variable ﬁnancial standing as instrument for the equity ratio. Our results
suggest that low levels of R&D activity do not require substantially higher levels of equity ﬁ-
nancing. However, companies with high R&D intensities, such as high-tech ﬁrms, need more
equity capital. These companies are therefore more dependent on a functioning market for
external equity.
24References
Acs, Z. J. and Audretsch, D. B. (1990), Innovation and Small Firms, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Aghion, P., Bond, S., Klemm, A. and Marinescu, I. (2004), ‘Technology and Financial Struc-
ture: Are Innovative Firms Diﬀerent?’, Journal of the European Economic Association
2, 277–288.
Arrow, K. J. (1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
R. Nelson, ed., ‘The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity’, Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Audretsch, D. B. and Eston, J. A. (1997), ‘Financing the German Mittelstand’, Small Busi-
ness Economics 9, 97–110.
Audretsch, D. B. and Eston, J. A. (2002), ‘Does Firm Size Matter? – Evidence on the Im-
pact of Liquidity Constraints on Firm Investment Behavior in Germany’, International
Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 1–17.
Audretsch, D. B. and Weigand, J. (2005), ‘Do Knowledge Conditions Make a Diﬀerence?
Investment, Finance and Ownership in German Industries’, Research Policy 34, 595–
613.
Bah, R. and Dumontier, P. (2001), ‘R&D Intensity and Corporate Financial Policy: Some
International Evidence’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 28, 671–692.
Baldwin, J. R., Gellatly, G. and Gaudreault, V. (2002), ‘Financing Innovation in New Small
Firms: New Evidence From Canada’, Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 190.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1995), ‘Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small
Firm Finance’, Journal of Business 68, 351–381.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1998), ‘The Economics of Small Business Finance: The
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle’, Journal of
Banking and Finance 22, 613–673.
25Bester, H. (1985), ‘Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information’,
American Economic Review 75, 850–855.
Bhagat, S. and Welch, I. (1995), ‘Corporate Research & Development Investments – Inter-
national Comparisons’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 443–470.
Black, B. S. and Gilson, R. J. (1998), ‘Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243–277.
Bond, S., Harhoﬀ, D. and Van Reenen, J. (2007), ‘Investment, R&D, and Financial Con-
straints in Britain and Germany’, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique (forthcoming).
Bottazzi, L. and Da Rin, M. (2002), ‘European Venture Capital’, Economic Policy 34, 229–
269.
Busom, I. (2000), ‘An Empirical Evaluation of the Eﬀects of R&D Subsidies’, Economics of
Innovation and New Technology 9, 111–148.
BVK (2006), ‘BVK Statistik 2005’, German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association
(BVK), Berlin, www.bvk-ev.de.
Cassar, G. (2004), ‘The Financing of Business Start-Ups’, Journal of Business Venturing
19, 261–283.
Chiao, C. (2002), ‘Relationship Between Debt, R&D and Physical Investment, Evidence
from US Firm-level Data’, Applied Financial Economics 12, 105–121.
Chittenden, F., Hall, G. and Hutchinson, P. (1996), ‘Small Firm Growth, Access to Capital
Markets and Financial Structure: Review of Issues and an Empirical Investigation’,
Small Business Economics 8, 59–67.
Cohen, W. M. and Klepper, S. (1996), ‘A Reprise of Size and R&D’, Economic Journal
106, 925–951.
Cohen, W. M. and Levin, R. C. (1989), Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Struc-
ture, in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, eds, ‘Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Volume II’, Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 1059–1107.
26Cragg, J. (1971), ‘Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Applica-
tions to the Demand for Durable Goods’, Econometrica 39, 829–944.
Cressy, R. and Olofsson, C. (1997), ‘The Financial Conditions for Swedish SMEs: Survey
and Research Agenda’, Small Business Economics 9, 179–194.
Czarnitzki, D. and Kraft, K. (2004), ‘Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Ac-
tivity’, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-75, Mannheim.
Egeln, J., Licht, G. and Steil, F. (1997), ‘Firm Foundations and the Role of Financial
Constraints’, Small Business Economics 9, 137–150.
Elsas, R. and Krahnen, J. P. (2002), ‘Collateral, Relationship Lending and Financial Distress:
An Empirical Study on Financial Contracting’, Goethe-Universit¨ at Frankfurt, Working
Paper.
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, G. and Petersen, B. (1988), ‘Financing Constraints and Corporate
Investment’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988, 141–206.
Freel, M. S. (1999), ‘The Financing of Small Firm Product Innovation Within the UK’,
Technovation 19, 707–719.
Freel, M. S. (2007), ‘Are Small Innovators Credit Rationed?’, Small Business Economics
28, 23–35.
Fritsch, M., Brixy, U. and Falck, O. (2006), ‘The Eﬀect of Industry, Region and Time on New
Business Survival – A Multi-Dimensional Analysis’, Review of Industrial Organization
28, 285–306.
Giudici, G. and Paleari, S. (2000), ‘The Provision of Finance to Innovation: A Survey
Conducted among Italian Technology-based Small Firms’, Small Business Economics
14, 37–53.
Guiso, L. (1998), ‘High-tech Firms and Credit Rationing’, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 35, 39–59.
Hall, B. H. (1992), ‘Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level: Does the
Source of Financing Matter?’, NBER Working Paper No. 4096.
27Hall, B. H. (2005), The Financing of Innovation, in S. Shane, ed., ‘Handbook of Technology
Management’, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.
Harhoﬀ, D. (1998), ‘Are There Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German
Manufacturing Firms?’, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 49/50, 421–456.
Hartarska, V. and Gonzalez-Vega, C. (2006), ‘What Aﬀects New and Established Firms’
Expansion? Evidence from Small Firms in Russia’, Small Business Economics 27, 195–
206.
Himmelberg, C. P. and Petersen, B. C. (1994), ‘R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study
of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries’, Review of Economics and Statistics 76, 38–51.
Hughes, A. (1997), ‘Finance for SMEs: A U.K. Perspective’, Small Business Economics
9, 151–166.
Hyytinen, A. and Pajarinen, M. (2005), ‘Financing of Technology-Intensive Small Businesses:
Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of the ICT Sector’, Information Economics and Policy
17, 115–132.
Irwin, D. and Klenow, P. (1994), ‘Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor Indus-
try’, Journal of Political Economy 102, 1200–1227.
Jordan, J., Lowe, J. and Taylor, P. (1998), ‘Strategy and Financial Policy in UK Small
Firms’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 25, 1–27.
Krahnen, J. P. and Schmidt, R. H. (2004), The German Financial System, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Lehmann, E., Neuberger, D. and R¨ athke, S. (2004), ‘Lending to Small and Medium-Sized
Firms: Is There an East-West Gap in Germany?’, Small Business Economics 23, 23–39.
Link, A. N. and Bozeman, B. (1991), ‘Innovative Behavior in Small-Sized Firms’, Small
Business Economics 3, 179–184.
Lucas, R. E. (1993), ‘Making a Miracle’, Econometrica 61, 251–271.
Mac An Bhaird, C. and Lucey, B. (2006), ‘What Determines the Capital Structure of SMEs:
Irish Evidence’, Working Paper, Dublin City University and Trinity College Dublin.
28Maddala, G. S. (1983), Limited-dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Manigart, S. and Struyf, C. (1997), ‘Financing High Technology Startups In Belgium: An
Explorative Study’, Small Business Economics 9, 125–135.
M¨ uller, E. (forthcoming), ‘Beneﬁts of Control, Capital Structure and Company Growth’,
Applied Economics .
Murray, G. C. and Lott, J. (1995), ‘Have UK Venture Capitalists a Bias Against Investment
in New Technology-based Firms?’, Research Policy 24, 283–299.
Niefert, M., Metzger, G., Heger, D. and Licht, G. (2006), ‘Hightech-Gr¨ undungen in Deutsch-
land: Trends und Entwicklungsperspektiven [High-tech Startups in Germany: Trends
and Outlook]’, Final Report, Mannheim.
Ou, C. and Haynes, G. W. (2006), ‘Acquisition of Additional Equity Capital by Small
Firms – Findings from the National Survey of Small Business Finances’, Small Business
Economics 27, 157–168.
Peters, B. (2004), ‘Employment Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Innovation Activities: Microeconometric
Evidence’, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-73, Mannheim.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1995), ‘The Eﬀect of Credit Market Competition on
Lending Relationships’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407–43.
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. (1994), ‘The Beneﬁts of Firm-Creditor Relationships: Evidence
From Small Business Data’, Journal of Finance 49, 3–37.
Rammer, C., M¨ uller, E., Heger, D., Aschhoﬀ, B., Zimmermann, V. and Reize, F. (2006), In-
novationspotenziale von kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen [The Innovative Potential
of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises], ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen, Vol. 79, Baden-
Baden.
Sch¨ afer, D., Werwatz, A. and Zimmermann, V. (2004), ‘The Determinants of Debt and (Pri-
vate) Equity Financing: the Case of Young, Innovative SMEs from Germany’, Industry
and Innovation 11, 255–248.
29Scherer, F. (1991), Changing Perspectives on the Firm Size Problem, in Z. J. Acs and D. B.
Audretsch, eds, ‘Innovation and Technological Change: An International Comparison’,
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 24–38.
Scott, J. T. (2000a), An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research Program in
New England: Fast Track Compared with Non-Fast Track Projects, in C. W. Wess-
ner, ed., ‘The Small Business Innovation Research Program: An Assessment of the
Department of Defense Fast Track Initiative’, National Academy Press, Washington,
DC, pp. 104–140.
Scott, J. T. (2000b), ‘The Directions for Technological Change: Alternative Economic Ma-
jorities and Opportunity Costs’, Review of Industrial Organization 17, 1–16.
Singh, M. and Faircloth, S. (2005), ‘The Impact of Corporate Debt on Long Term Investment
and Firm Performance’, Applied Economics 37, 875–883.
Staiger, D. and Stock, J. (1997), ‘Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments’,
Econometrica 65, 557–586.
Stata (2007), Stata Base Reference Manual, Volume 2, I-P, Relase 10, Stata Press, College
Station, Texas.
Stifterverband (2005), ‘FuE Info 1/2005’, Stifterverband f¨ ur die Deutsche Wissenschaft, Es-
sen.
Stiglitz, J. (1985), ‘Credit Markets and the Control of Capital’, Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 17, 133–152.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981), ‘Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informa-
tion’, American Economic Review 71, 393–409.
Westhead, P. and Storey, D. J. (1997), ‘Financial Constraints on the Growth of High Tech-
nology Small Firms in the United Kingdom’, Applied Financial Economics 7, 197–201.
Winker, P. (1999), ‘Causes and Eﬀects of Financing Constraints at the Firm Level’, Small
Business Economics 12, 169–181.
30Zimmermann, V. and Karle, H. (2005), ‘Das Gesch¨ aftsklima im deutschen Beteiligungs-
kapitalmarkt. Entwicklung und Einﬂussfaktoren [The Business Climate in the Ger-
man Private Equity Market. Development and Inﬂuencing Factors]’, Finanz Betrieb
6/2005, 445–455.
31